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Cognitive Maps, Cognitive Collages, 
and spatial Mental Models 
abSTracT1
Although cognitive map is a popular metaphor for people’s mental representations 
of environments, as it is typically conceived, it is often too restrictive. Two other 
metaphors for mental representations are proposed and supported. Cognitive 
collages are consistent with research demonstrating systematic errors in memory 
and judgment of environmental knowledge. Yet, for some simple or well-known 
environments, people seem to have coherent representations of the coarse spatial 
relations among elements. These spatial mental models allow inference and per-
spective-taking but may not allow accurate metric judgments.2
1  inTrodUcTion
1.1  Cognitive Maps
There is a popular view that people’s mental representations of environments are 
embodied in „cognitive maps.” Like many useful concepts, the term cognitive map 
has many senses, leading to inevitable misunderstandings. One prevalent sense is 
that cognitive maps are maplike mental constructs that can be mentally inspected. 
They are presumed to be learned by gradually acquiring elements of the world, first 
landmarks, pointlike elements, then routes, linelike ele ments, and finally unifying 
the landmarks and routes with metric survey information. The appeal of this view 
is manifold. As cognitive, they are presumed to differ from „true” maps of the 
environment. Social scientists from many disciplines would be quick to bring forth 
evidence for that. As maps, they are presumed to be coherent wholes that reflect 
spatial relations among elements. As mental constructs available to mental inspection, 
cognitive maps are presumed to be like real maps available to real inspection, as 
well as like images, which, according to the classical view of mental imagery, are like 
internalized perceptions.
1.2  Constructionist View
In this paper, I will present evidence not compatible with the view of mental represen-
tations of environments as cognitive maps. I will discuss two alternative constructionist 
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views of the mental representations underlying people’s knowledge of environments. 
According to the constructionist view, people acquire disparate pieces of know-
ledge about environments, knowledge that they use when asked to remember an 
environment, describe a route, sketch a map, or make a judgment about location, 
direction, or distance. The separate pieces include recollections of journeys, memories 
of maps, recall of verbal (aural or written) directions and facts, and more. As for 
any human memory task, it is possible that not all the relevant stored information 
will be retrieved when needed.
1.3  Cognitive Collages
In many instances, especially for environments not known in detail, the information 
relevant to memory or judgment may be in different forms, some of them not maplike 
at all. Some of the information may be systematically distorted as well. It is unlikely 
that the pieces of information can or will be organized into a single, coherent map-
like cognitive structure. In these cases, rather than resembling maps, people’s internal 
representations seem to be more like collages. Collages are thematic overlays of 
multimedia from different points of view. They lack the coherence of maps, but 
do contain figures, partial information, and differing perspectives. In the second 
section, I will review some of the evidence for the notion that cognitive collage is 
often a more appropriate metaphor for environmental knowledge than cognitive 
map. That evidence shows that memory and judgment are systematically distorted 
and potentially contradictory, thus not easily reconcilable in a maplike structure.
1.4  Spatial Mental Models
In other situations, especially where environments are simple or well-learned, 
people seem to have quite accurate mental representations of spatial layouts. On 
close examination, these representations capture the categorical spatial relations 
among elements coherently, allowing perspective-taking, reorientation, and spatial 
inferences. In contrast to cognitive maps and cognitive collages, these have been 
termed spatial mental models. Unlike cognitive maps, they may not preserve metric 
information. Unlike cognitive collages, they do preserve coarse spatial relations 
coherently. These are relations that are easily comprehended from language as well 
as from direct experience. In the third section I will review some evidence for the 
success of language in inducing coherent mental representations of the categorical 
spatial relations in environments.
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2  SySTemaTic errorS in memory for enVironmenTS
2.1  Hierarchical Representations of Space
When students at U.C. San Diego were asked to draw the direction between 
San Diego and Reno, they incorrectly indicated that San Diego was west of Reno 
[36]. Indeed, it is surprising to learn that Reno is in fact west of San Diego. After 
all, California is on the western coast of the United States, and Reno is far inland, 
in Nevada. A glance at a map reveals that the coast of California, far from running 
north-south, in fact cuts eastward as it cuts southward. Stevens and Coupe attribu-
ted their findings to hierarchical representations of space. People do not remember 
the absolute locations of cities. Instead, they remember the states cities are part of, 
and the relative locations of the states. Then they infer the relative locations of 
cities from the locations of their superset states. Since this (shall I call it „landmark?”) 
study, other evidence for hierarchical representations of geographic knowledge has 
accumulated. Hierarchical organization has been found to distort distance judg-
ments as well as direction judgments [11]. Hirtle and Jonides asked one group of 
students at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor to form subjective groups of 
buildings in town. They grouped the buildings according to function, commercial 
or educational. Another group of students was asked to judge distances betwe-
en pairs of buildings. Distances between functional groupings were overestimated 
relative to distances within functional groupings. Chase found that a detailed 
hierarchical organization distinguished experienced taxi drivers from novices [4]. 
Other studies have demonstrated that people impose a hierarchy on what is in 
reality a flat two-dimensional display, and that that affects judgment and memory for 
environments [for example, 12, 23, 24, 25, 44; for a brief review, see 42 and 43]. 
Of course there are no hierarchies in maps, so this widespread cognitive pheno-
menon already introduces a distorting factor difficult to reconcile with maps.
2.2  Cognitive Perspective
Experienced hikers know that distances between nearby landmarks appear relatively 
larger than distances between faraway landmarks, though it is difficult to make 
adequate compensation for that. A similar phenomenon occurs in making distance 
judgments from memory. Holyoak and Mah [14] asked one group of students to 
imagine themselves on the East Coast of the United States, and another group 
to imagine themselves on the West Coast of the United States. Both groups were 
then asked to estimate the distances between pairs of U.S. cities along an east-west 
axis, for example, San Francisco and Salt Lake City, New York City and Pittsburgh. 
The students given a West Coast perspective overestimated the distances between 
the westerly pairs relative to the easterly pairs, and the students given an East 
Coast perspective did the opposite. Thus, the vantage point assigned for making 
the judgments systematically distorted the judgments.
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2.3  Cognitive Reference Points
When I am out of state and asked where I live, I usually answer, „Near San Francisco.” 
If I am closer to home, I will answer, „On Stanford campus,” or „Off Stanford Avenue,” 
or „Next door to the ----s.” In other words, rather than giving an exact location, I 
convey where I live relative to a reference point [see 8] that I believe my questioner 
will know. Not only do we describe less-known locations relative to better-known 
landmarks, we also seem to remember them that way. As is often the case in memory, 
we describe situations to ourselves just as we would describe them to others. 
Remembering less prominent locations relative to landmarks induces a distortion 
that is particularly intractable for metric maps, namely asymmetric distance. Sadalla, 
Burroughs, and Staplin [32] have found that people judge the distance from an 
ordinary building to a landmark to be smaller than the distance from a landmark to 
an ordinary building.
2.4  Alignment
Remembering one spatial location with respect to another leads to direction distor-
tions as well. Two nearly-aligned locations tend to be grouped, in a Gestalt sense, 
in memory, and then remembered as more closely aligned than they actually were 
[41]. Students were given two maps of the Americas, one a correct map, and the 
other, a map in which South America was moved westward with respect to North 
America, so that the two Americas were more closely aligned. A significant majo-
rity of the students thought the altered map was the correct one. Another group 
of students selected a world map in which the Americas were moved northward 
relative to Europe and Africa in preference to a correct map of the world. In the 
preferred incorrect map, the United States was more closely aligned with Europe 
and South America with Africa. Alignment errors in memory were also obtained for 
judgments of directions between cities, for example, students incorrectly thought 
that Boston was west of Rio de Janeiro and that Rome was south of Philadelphia. 
Alignment was also observed in memory for local environments most likely learned 
from navigation rather than maps, in memory for artificial countries and cities, and 
in memory for blobs not interpreted as maps.
2.5  Rotation
Remembering a spatial location relative to a frame of reference can also lead to 
direction distortions [41]. Think of a situation where the orientation of a land mass 
is not quite the same as the orientation of its frame of reference. A good example 
is South America, which appears to be tilted in a north-south east-west frame. In 
fact, when students were given cutouts of South America and asked to place them 
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correctly with respect to the canonical directions, most students uprighted South 
America. Similar errors appeared for the San Francisco Bay Area, the environment 
immediately surrounding the students, and for artificial maps and blobs as well, in 
our work as well as that of others [4, 21, 22].
2.6  Other Systematic Errors
This is by no means a complete catalog of systematic errors in memory and judgment 
of environments. Irregular geographic features may be regularized. For example, 
Parisians straighten out the Seine [27], and Americans seem to straighten out the 
Canadian border [36 as interpreted by 43]. Turns and angles are regularized to right 
angles [3, 13, 29, 34]. Distance judgments are arguably more complex than direction 
judgments. They are rarely known directly, so they seem to entail use of a number 
of surrogates that may yield distortions. Distances have been judged longer when 
a route has barriers or detours [7, 18, 30], when a route has more turns or nodes 
[33, 35], and when a route has more clutter [40].
2.7  Cognitive Collages
Thus, a number of different factors, hierarchical representations, cognitive perspec- 
tives, cognitive reference points, alignment to other locations, rotation to a frame 
of reference, regularization of geographic features, and more, can systematically 
distort memory and judgment of environments. On the whole, each empirical study 
has isolated the effects of a single factor, but in real cases, many factors may be 
operative. There is no guarantee that the distorting factors are consistent; in fact, it 
seems easy to construct cases where one factor would distort in one direction and 
another factor in another direction. The distortions alone are incompatible with 
a metric mental map, and inconsistent distortions make mental maps an even less 
satisfactory explanation. Of course, not all our spatial knowledge is distorted. Some 
of it may be quite accurate. But even so, it is unlikely to be complete, so that prob-
lems arise when trying to put it all together, especially if some of the information 
is erroneous and if the information from different sources is not compatible. The 
inconsistencies, however, seem to provide a mechanism to reduce error. When 
subjects are asked for more information from an environment, it turns out that 
their judgments become more accurate [1, 2, 26]. This could happen because when 
confronted with their own inconsistencies, people retrieve additional information 
that allows them to reconcile the inconsistencies in the correct direction. It could 
also happen if there were a large number of unreliable judgments, with the majority 
going toward the correct. Figures can emerge from collages. In many real world 
situations, however, people are asked for partial information and may not use other 
information as a corrective.
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2.8  Two Basic Relations
The situation is not always as chaotic as I’ve implied. Most of us manage to find 
our ways most of the time, either because an environment is familiar, or because we 
use maps or instructions or environmental cues or all of the above or more. For some 
well-learned environments, large-scale or small, people’s knowledge can be well-
organized and systematic. In those cases, the knowledge often has the form of locating 
elements relative to one another from a point of view or of locating an element 
relative to a higher order environmental feature or reference frame. Interestingly, the 
systematic errors described depend on these basic relations. The errors attributable
to cognitive perspective, cognitive reference points, and alignment rest on representing 
landmarks relative to one another from a vantage point. The errors attributable 
to hierarchical organization and to rotation are based in representing a landmark 
relative to a higher order feature, a region or a frame of reference. Although much of 
human knowledge about space, including systematic errors, can be reduced to these 
two-relations, some cannot. These two simple relations can form a foundation for 
spatial knowledge from which memory and judgment are constructed. Although the 
relations can be quite coarse, they can also be refined by adding constraints imposed 
by other spatial relations. Significantly, these relations also form the basis for spatial 
language used in descriptions of environments. Because the spatial relations between 
elements or between an element and a reference frame can be expressed by the 
many disparate formats that convey environmental knowledge, the relations provide 
a means to integrate spatial information from different formats.
3  SPaTial deScriPTionS
One of the major functions of language is to convey experience vicariously. Anyone 
who has laughed out loud reading a novel or felt their heart beat rapidly reading 
a mystery knows that. Describing space effectively must have been an early use of 
language, in order to tell others where to find food and where to avoid danger. 
Although modern-day spatial language can convey locations of landmarks with 
great accuracy using formal systems designed for that purpose, everyday spatial 
language is not very precise. Typical spatial expressions like „next to,” „between,” 
„to the left of,” „in front of,” „east of,” and „on top of” describe spatial relations at 
coarse levels of precision, but their frequency in the language suggests that they 
are easily produced and readily understood. These expressions convey the relations 
between elements. Expressions like „within,” „contains,” „divides,” „borders,” and 
„curves” convey the relations between elements and reference frames. [For more 
discussion of spatial language, see for example, 6, 9, 15, 19, 28, 31.]
3.1  Comprehending Route and Survey Descriptions
Taylor and I have been interested in the nature of the spatial information that lan-
guage alone can impart [37, 38]. Thus far, we have only investigated those spatial 
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expressions that seem to be readily produced and understood. Spatial descriptions 
normally assume a perspective, explicit or implicit. An informal survey of guide-
books indicated that descriptions of environments take one of two perspectives. 
A route perspective takes readers on a mental tour of the environment, describing 
landmarks with respect to the (mentally) changing position of the reader in terms of 
the reader’s front, back, left, and right. A survey perspective gives readers a bird’s 
eye view, and describes landmarks relative to one another in terms of north, south, 
east, and west These two perspectives have parallels with two major means of 
learning about environments, the first through exploration, and the second through 
maps. They also have parallels to a distinction made in knowledge representation 
that is both popular and controversial, namely, procedural and declarative.
Design. In our first set of experiments [38], students studied either a route or a 
survey description of each of four environments. Two of the environments were 
large-scale, one county-sized and the other a small town, and two were smaller, 
a zoo and a convention center. The environments contained about a dozen land-
marks. After studying the descriptions, students responded true or false to a series 
of statements: verbatim statements taken from both the perspective read and the 
other perspective and inference statements from both perspectives. The inference 
statements contained information that was not explicitly stated in either text, but 
could be inferred from information in either text. If perspective was encoded in 
the mental representations, then inference statements from the read perspective 
should be verified more quickly than inference statements from the other perspec-
tive. After responding to the statements, students drew maps of the environments.
Results. From only studying the descriptions, students were able to produce maps 
that were nearly error-free, indicating that language alone was sufficient to accurately 
convey coarse spatial relations. The speed and accuracy to answer the true/false 
questions suggested that readers formed at least two mental representations of 
the text, one of the language of the text, and another of the situation described by 
the text, that is the spatial relations among the landmarks. We termed the latter a 
spatial mental model [cf. 16] to distinguish it from an image. Responses to verbatim 
statements were faster and more accurate than responses to inference statements. 
Presumably, verbatim statements were verified against a representation of the 
language of the descriptions, but inference statements had to be verified against 
a representation of the situation, a spatial mental model. Even though responses 
were faster and more accurate to verbatim statements, the overall level of respond-
ing to inference statements was high. Subjects were able to verify spatial relations 
not specifically stated in the text, further support for the creation of spatial mental 
models. Responses to inference statements from the read perspective were neither 
faster nor more accurate than responses to inference statements from the other 
perspective, for both perspectives. This result was obtained in four separate experi- 
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ments, including one where the students read only a single description and did not 
know they would be asked to draw maps.
Spatial Mental Models vs. Images. In this situation, where subjects studied coherent 
spatial descriptions of relatively simple environments, perspective did not seem to 
be encoded in the spatial mental models. Rather, the spatial mental models const-
ructed seemed to be more abstract than either perspective. These spatial mental 
models appeared to capture the spatial relations among landmarks in a perspective- 
free manner, allowing the taking of either perspective with equal ease. As such, 
these spatial mental models are akin to an architect’s model or a structural description 
of an object. They have no prescribed perspective, but permit many perspectives 
to be taken on them. Thus, spatial mental models are more abstract than images, 
which are restricted to a specific point of view [see 10, 17].
3.2  Producing Spatial Descriptions
Descriptions composed of the simple spatial relations between landmarks and between 
landmarks and reference frames were successful in inducing coherent spatial mental 
representations. It is then natural to ask what is the nature of the spatial descrip-
tions that ordinary people spontaneously produce. In two experiments, Taylor and 
I [39] gave students maps to study, and asked them to write descriptions of the 
environments from memory. A compass rose appeared in each of the maps, allowing 
orientation with respect to the canonical axes, north-south and east-west. In a third 
study, we asked subjects to write descriptions of familiar environments they had 
learned from experience.
Survey, Route, and Mixed Descriptions. The descriptions subjects produced indicated 
that subjects regarded the maps as environments, and not as marks on pieces of 
paper. Perspective was scored using the definitions of route and survey described 
previously. As our intuitions suggested, descriptions used either route or survey 
perspectives, or a combination of both. No other style of description emerged. In 
the mixed perspective descriptions, either one perspective was used for parts of an 
environment and the other perspective for other parts, or both perspectives were 
used simultaneously for at least part of the descriptions. Across a wide variety of 
environments, survey, route, and mixed descriptions were obtained, their relative 
frequency depending in part on features of the environments. This was despite 
widespread claims that most spatial descriptions take a consistent perspective, 
specifically, a route perspective [for review, see 20]. The descriptions that subjects 
wrote from memory were quite accurate. They allowed a naive group of subjects to 
place nearly all the landmarks correctly [37].
COgnitiVe MapS, COgnitiVe COllageS, anD Spatial Mental MODelS    I     19 
Basic Relations and Coherence. A detailed analysis of the words, phrases, and 
clauses used in the descriptions revealed that the essence of a route description was 
describing the locations of landmarks relative to a single referent with a known 
perspective, in this case, the moving position of the reader. The essence of a survey 
description was describing the location of a landmark relative to the location of 
another landmark from a fixed perspective. These parallel the two basic relations 
described earlier. The situation is slightly more complex, however. In route descrip-
tions, although the referent was constant, the orientation and location of the 
referent kept changing. Readers had to keep track of that orientation and location 
relative to the canonical frame of reference. Both our own and our subjects’ route 
descriptions oriented readers with respect to north-south east-west. In survey 
descriptions, the referent kept changing, but the orientation was constant. Route 
descriptions, then, establish coherence by relating all landmarks to a single referent. 
They are complicated by the task of keeping track of the orientation of the referent. 
Survey descriptions establish coherence by using a single orientation, but they are 
complicated by changing the referent element. When either type of information is 
consistent and complete, as it was in the descriptions we wrote and in many of the 
descriptions subjects wrote, the individual pieces of information can be integrated 
into a coherent representation of the spatial relations among the landmarks inde-
pendent of any specific perspective.
3.3  Spatial Mental Models
The integration of the relative locations of landmarks i ndependent of perspective 
or orientation that occurs when people read spatial descriptions also seems to 
occur as people navigate the world. It would be inefficient to remember successive 
snapshots of the world because they would not allow recognition or navigation from 
other points of view. It makes more sense to isolate landmarks, and to remember 
their locations relative to one another and relative to a frame of reference so that 
recognition and way-finding are successful from different starting points. For simple, 
familiar environments, whether learned from direct experience, or learned vicariously 
through language, people can form coherent mental representations of the spatial 
relations among landmarks.
4  conclUSionS
Despite its considerable appeal, as traditionally used, the „cognitive map” metaphor 
does not reflect the complexity and richness of environmental knowledge. That 
knowledge comes in a variety of forms, memory snippets of maps we’ve seen, routes 
we’ve taken, areas we’ve heard or read about, facts about distances or directions. 
It can also include knowledge of time zones and flying or driving times and climate. 
Even knowledge of historical conquests and linguistic families can be used to make 
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inferences about spatial proximity. Some of that information may contain errors, 
systematic or random. When we need to remember or to make a judgment, we 
call on whatever information seems relevant. Because the snippets of information 
may be incomparable, we may have no way of integrating them. For those situa-
tions, cognitive collage is a more fiing metaphor for environmental knowledge. 
Yet, there are areas that we seem to know quite well, either because they are familiar 
or simple or both. Even in those cases, metric knowledge can be schematic or 
distorted. What our knowledge seems to consist of in those cases is the coarse 
spatial relations among landmarks, what we have termed spatial mental models. 
Although spatial mental models may not allow accurate metric judgments, they 
do allow spatial perspectivetaking and inferences about spatial locations. They are 
constructed from basic spatial relations, relations between elements with respect 
to a perspective or between an element and a frame of reference. Those situations 
that are simple and that we know well are also easy to describe. Languages abound 
in expressions for categorical spatial relations. These expressions are readily pro-
duced and easily understood. Although many languages have adopted technical 
systems to convey metric information about location, orientation, and distance, 
this terminology is not widely used in everyday speech. When it is used in everyday 
situations, it is often used schematically. Apparently, descriptions using, categorical 
spatial relations are sufficient for everyday uses. Viewed as mental models or cognitive 
collages, environmental knowledge is not very different from other forms of know-
ledge. Just as for environments, there are areas of other knowledge where our infor-
mation is consistent and integrated, but there are also areas where, because of incomp-
leteness or incomparability or error information cannot be consistent and integrated.
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